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Preface 
The research project on Systems Analysis of Technological and Economic Dynamics a t  IIASA is 
concerned with modeling technological and organisational change; the broader economic devel- 
opments that  are associated with technological change, both as cause and effect; the processes 
by which economic agents - first of all, business firms - acquire and develop the capabilities 
to  generate, imitate and adopt technological and organisational innovations; and the aggregate 
dynamics - a t  the levels of single industries and whole economies - engendered by the interac- 
tions among agents which are heterogeneous in their innovative abilities, behavioural rules and 
expectations. The central purpose is to  develop stronger theory and better modeling techniques. 
However, the basic philosophy is that  such theoretical and modeling work is most fruitful when 
attention is paid to the known empirical details of the phenomena the work aims t o  address: 
therefore, a considerable effort is put into a better understanding of the 'stylized facts' concern- 
ing corporate organisation routines and strategy; industrial evolution and the 'demography' of 
firms; patterns of macroeconomic growth and trade. 
From a modeling perspective, over the last decade considerable progress has been made on 
various techniques of dynamic modeling. Some of this work has employed ordinary differential 
and difference equations, and some of it stochastic equations. A number of efforts have taken 
advantage of the growing power of simulation techniques. Others have employed more traditional 
mathematics. As a result of this theoretical work, the toolkit for modeling technological and 
economic dynamics is significantly richer than it was a decade ago. 
During the same period, there have been major advances in the empirical understanding. 
There are now many more detailed technological histories available. Much more is known about 
the similarities and differences of technical advance in different fields and industries and there is 
some understanding of the key variables that  lie behind those differences. A number of studies 
have provided rich information about how industry structure co-evolves with technology. In 
addition to  empirical work a t  the technology or sector level, the last decade has also seen a 
great deal of empirical research on productivity growth and measured technical advance at  the 
level of whole economies. A considerable body of empirical research now exists on the facts that  
seem associated with different rates of productivity growth across the range of nations, with the 
dynamics of convergence and divergence in the levels and rates of growth of income, with the 
diverse national institutional arrangements in which technological change is embedded. 
As a result of this recent empirical work, the questions that  successful theory and useful 
modeling techniques ought to  address now are much more clearly defined. The theoretical work 
has often been undertaken in appreciation of certain stylized facts that  needed t o  be explained. 
The list of these 'facts' is indeed very long, ranging from the microeconomic evidence concerning 
for example dynamic increasing returns in learning activities or the persistence of particular sets 
of problem-solving routines within business firms; the industry-level evidence on entry, exit and 
size-distributions - approximately log-normal - all the way to  the evidence regarding the time- 
series properties of major economic aggregates. However, the connection between the theoretical 
work and the empirical phenomena has so far not been very close. The philosophy of this project 
is that  the chances of developing powerful new theory and useful new analytical techniques can 
be greatly enhanced by performing the work in an environment where scholars who understand 
the empirical phenomena provide questions and challenges for the theorists and their work. 
In particular, the project is meant to  pursue an 'evolutionary' interpretation of technological 
and economic dynamics modeling, first, the processes by which individual agents and organisa- 
tions learn, search, adapt; second, the economic analogues of 'natural selection' by which inter- 
active environments - often markets - winnow out  a population whose members have different 
attributes and behavioural traits; and,  third, the collective emergence of statistical patterns, 
regularities and higher-level structures as the aggregate outcomes of the two former processes. 
Together with a group of researchers located permanently a t  IIASA, the project coordinates 
multiple research efforts undertaken in several institutions around the world, organises workshops 
and provides a venue of scientific discussion among scholars working on evolutionary modeling, 
computer simulation and non-linear dynamical systems. 
The  research focuses upon the following three major areas: 
1. Learning Processes and Organisational Competence. 
2. Technological and Industrial Dynamics 
3. Innovation, Competition and Macrodynamics 
The Formation of Beliefs on 
Financial Markets: 
Represent at iveness and Prototypes 
I. Introduction 
As rational expectations, and more recently rational learning, have become the usual way 
to embody the formation of individual beliefs and their evolution in economic models, 
empirical evidence gathered from market surveys and experiments is accumulating which 
shows systematic departure from the rationality hypothesis. These departures from 
rationality are especially salient on financial markets, where numerous studies (e.g. 
Frankel & Froot, 1987; Shiller, 1989; De Bondt & Thaler, 1990) have highlighted 
systematic biases in the formation of agents' beliefsl. 
This kind of biases have been studied in different settings by cognitive psychologists 
since a long time (see Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky (Eds.), 1982, from now on KST, 
1982). Their pervasiveness and their similarity across domains, i.e. their robustness, 
suggest that agents don't behave in a rational fashion while constructing their judgements 
and expectations, neither on financial markets' nor elsewhere. More specifically, the way 
they revise their beliefs in front of new information is not Bayesian: they tend to be 
insensitive to prior knowledge and to sample size (Camerer, 1987; KST, 1982), and to 
be overconfident in their judgments relatively to the available evidence (Shiller, 1989; 
KST, 1982; Griffin & Tversky, 1992). Hence, from a descriptive point of view, the 
evolution of individual beliefs does not seem to be adequately modelled by a rational 
learning process which postulates -among others- Bayesian revision and convergence of 
beliefs toward a unique "true" model of the world2. 
As put forward by Kahneman & Tversky, the fact that these judgements are 
systematically biased in the same directions shows that we use other procedures than 
probabilistic updating to form our judgements. These procedures are generally simpler, 
such as rules of thumb and heuristics. They have identified few of these heuristics which 
have since been extensively studied (see KST, 1982), e.g. representativeness, 
availability, anchoring ... 
This paper is about the representativeness heuristic, i.e. judging by closeness and/or 
familiarity with a typical case (a more precise definition will be given below). The 
discussion will be restrained to representativeness and its consequences on the formation 
of beliefs, but further investigation should show that other heuristics, like availability, 
anchoring and simulation play a role in markets too. 
The purpose of this paper is centered around the following question: as asked by 
Arrow, 1982, is the representativeness heuristic at work on financial markets, and if yes, 
could it help to explain some of the so-called irrationality of these markets? In other 
words, is it possible that phenomena like overreaction to new information, cumulative 
deviations and bubbles be generated by the fact that agents on these markets use 
representativeness instead of Bayes' rule in constructing their judgements? The findings 
of this study tend to favour positive answers to these questions: "heuristics matter". 
The theoretical implications of these "appreciative" results3 are not trivial. Actually, if 
economic agents do use a heuristic such as representativeness to form and revise their 
beliefs, the Bayesian learning approach does no longer offer an adequate framework for 
representing individual knowledge and its evolution. Thus, one needs another 
representation of learning processes which would, among other, at least be compatible 
with the empirical evidence mentioned above, and account for the fact that individuals 
mainly -but not exclusively- use heuristics instead of probability theory in constructing 
their beliefs. Some recent theoretical developments in cognitive psychology and Artificial 
Intelligence could shed light on the cognitive mechanisms generating behaviours like 
judgement by representativeness. These approaches are not unified, but they share some 
basic concepts such as prototypical categories and mental models (see for instance 
Johnson-Laird, 1983, Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett & Thagard, 1986, and Lakoff, 1987), 
and can give some theoretical foundations as to why individuals use heuristics like 
representativeness in forming and revising their beliefs. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section I1 presents some empirical evidence about 
the representativeness heuristic. The consequences of the use of this heuristic on 
financial behaviours and asset price dynamics are discussed in section 111. Section IV 
introduces theoretical issues concerning representativeness and processes of 
categorization. Section V concludes and highlights perspectives for future research. 
11. Empirical evidence about representativeness 
Definition 
Before presenting some empirical results about the use of the representativeness 
heuristic in belief formation, it is necessary to define precisely in what sense this term 
will be used here. Tversky & Kahneman (in KST, 1982, ch. 6) distinguish two different 
meanings of the concept. In the first acceptation, representativeness refers to a sample 
and its quality: "how representative of the population under study is the sample on which 
I base my judgement?". It has been shown that judgements of the representativeness of a 
sample are generally wrong, giving rise to biases such as the gambler fallacy, and to what 
Tversky & Kahneman labelled "the law of small numbers" (KST, 1982, ch. 2). 
Failures in judgements of representativeness can certainly be spotted in economic 
behaviours, but it is not the purpose of this paper. Instead, I wish to explore the 
consequences of representativeness in its second acceptation, which is less statistical and 
more cognitive. In this second sense, representativeness is a mean (a heuristic) by which 
individuals construct subjective probability judgements, and we will talk about 
judgements by representativeness. More precisely, a probability of an event constructed 
in this way is evaluated "by the degree to which [this event] is: (i) similar in essential 
properties to its parent population; and (ii) reflects the salient features of the process by 
which it is generated. [...I In many situations, an event A is judged more probable than 
an event B whenever A appears more representative than B" (Kahneman & Tversky in 
KST, 1982, ch. 3, p. 33). 
For instance, if one has to evaluate the probability that a given animal is a dog, the 
more the encountered animal resembles a typical dog, the higher the probability that it is a 
dog. Thus, similarity is essential in the way individuals form beliefs about the belonging 
of an object A to a class X, i.e. in categorization. Representativeness is also present in 
attributing causality, in evaluating the probability that an event A is caused by a process 
X. Let us take a description of a manager and try to predict if his firm makes high 
profits. If the manager is described in terms such as "young, ambitious and well- 
educated", the probability that his firm makes high profits will be judged higher than if 
the manager is "old, conservative and has not been to college", because the stereotype of 
a successful firm usually includes, in our times, a representation of a young and dynamic 
manager. It should be noted that these stereotypes often have a strong social dimension. 
The stereotype of a successful manager is not the same in France and in Japan, and these 
representations are different now from what they were in the 19th century. In other 
words, cognition -at least some part of it- is embedded (Granovetter, 1985), orembodied 
(Lakoff, 1987) in more global social structures such as institutions, norms, and collective 
representations (Durkheim, 1896). How are such stereotypical categories constructed 
and how do they evolve is an issue of great importance involving different theoretical 
questions, some of which will be evoked in section IV. 
Empirical evidence 
Experiments about the formation of beliefs by representativeness are numerous and 
many systematic biases frequently observed seem to be generated by the use of this 
heuristic (see Tversky & Kahneman, KST, 1982, ch. 1 for a brief introduction). Their 
results show that the Bayesian model of belief revision (in its Rational Learning 
acceptation) is not descriptively correct. In particular, it is well-established that (i) people 
tend to ignore prior information, and (ii) underestimate the importance of the quality of 
the evidence, its precision (they misjudge the representativeness of the sample, are prone 
to small sample bias etc ...). At the same time, they often give too much weight to the 
strength of the evidence, i.e. to the semantic content of an information, which can lead to 
an overestimation of probability judgements and to behaviours of overconfidence. Both 
of these cases will successively be reviewed in sections (i) and (ii), and a final point will 
draw some implications of the existence of such biases in "real world" settings. 
Before presenting some experiments, let us briefly recall Bayes' rule. 
Let HA and HB be two independent hypotheses such that HA n HB = 0 and 
HA u HB = 52. Let C be an event one can observe, i.e. an information. P(HA) is the 
prior probability of having hypothesis A true; P(HAIC) is the posterior probability of 
having hypothesis A verified when the event C is observed; P(CIHA) is the conditional 
probability of observing the event C when hypothesis HA is true, and P(C) is the 
unconditional probability of the event C. If we know P(HA) -it can be whatever 
subjective assessment-, P(C) and P(CIHA), then, Bayes' rule allows us to calculate the 
posterior probability of hypothesis A knowing C (the same holds of course for HB): 
n 
where P(C) = ~ P ( c I H , ) P ( H ~ )  and Hi = l  ... n, i.e. n mutually exclusive and 
i= 1 
collectively 
exhaustive hypothseses (here, n=2, HA and HB). Let us just remark that, if 
the calculus is very simple, it is nonetheless difficult to perform because the prerequisites 
in terms of knowledge are quite high. In order to calculate P(HilC), the individual has to 
know P(C) and P(CIHi), which may not be obvious. 
(i) Neglect of base rates information 
A well-known experiment done by Kahneman & Tversky (KST, 1982, ch. 4) 
highlights the tendency to be insensitive to prior information, contrary to the prediction of 
Bayes' rule. Two groups of subjects4 were given some identical descriptions of persons 
(age, family status, tastes and hobbies...). They were told that people could be of two 
"types", engineers and lawyers. In addition, they were given the prior probabilities 
attached to the two groups, lawyers and engineers, but the first group was told that there 
was 30% of lawyers and 70% of engineers and the second group was told the reverse, 
i.e. that there was 70% of lawyers and 30% of engineers. They were then asked to 
evaluate the probability that the person described was belonging to the group of 
engineers. Altogether, subjects were presented with five descriptions of persons, and the 
results were identical in all cases: prior information concerning the relative frequency of 
engineers in the population was not deemed relevant. One of such description was the 
following: 
"Jack is a 45-year-old man. He is married and has four children. He is generally 
conservative, careful, and ambitious. He shows no interest in political and social issues 
and spends most of his free time on his many hobbies which include home carpentry, 
sailing, and mathematical puzzles". 
Given the configuration of the priors in the two groups of subjects, the prediction of 
Bayesian theory would be that the first group would give a higher probability to the fact 
that Jack is an engineer, when the second group-would estimate it to be less probable. 
The results obtained by Kahneman & Tversky do not exhibit such pattern. Indeed, the 
two groups gave more or less the same estimation of the probability for Jack to be an 
engineer, revealing that they were not taking their prior information into account5. 
Different criticisms have been addressed to this kind of experiment. For instance, it is 
often argued that such verbal descriptions are not randomly drawn from the population, 
and this could explain the observed biases. Indeed, when the draws are verbal 
descriptions, it is difficult to establish if these descriptions reflect the characteristics of the 
population at large. Moreover, there is room for interpretation, and framing effects or the 
like could explain deviations from the Bayesian rule. Another criticism, often made by 
economists, concerns the monetary incentives individuals have in making the right 
choice. Economists usually claim that on real markets, people are experienced and must 
make the correct choice if they want to survive, otherwise they are selected out of the 
market6, a constraint which is not overwhelming in experiments7. 
Others experiments about representativeness and the neglect of priors have been 
designed to avoid these problems of "false" randomness and of monetary incentives, e.g. 
Grether, 1980, and Camerer, 1987. In order to compare the relative descriptive adequacy 
of Bayes' rule vs. representativeness in evaluating subjective probabilities, Grether made 
the following experiment. He used three "bingo cages", i.e. urns, containing each six 
balls. The first cage, X, contained six balls numbered one through six. The second 
cage, A, contained four balls marked with an "Nu and two balls marked with a "G", 
whereas in the third cage, B, there were three "N" balls and three "G" balls. The first 
urn, X, was used as a prior: a ball was drawn from X, and if it was numbered one to 
four, the urn A would be chosen; when the ball was numbered five or six, the urn B 
would be used. Then, six balls were drawn, with replacement, from the chosen urn. 
The subjects knew how the whole procedure was functioning, and the content of the 
three cages, but they were just observing the final draw of six balls ("Ns" and "Gs") 
without knowing from which urn, A or B, it had been drawn. For each sample of six 
balls, they were asked to estimate the probability that the sample had been drawn from A. 
As they also knew the content of X and the rule determining the choice between A and B, 
they knew the prior probability that the sample was coming from A8. In order to evaluate 
the incidence of monetary incentives, the subjects were divided into two groups: the first 
group was told that they would be paid a sure gain at the end of the experiment; in the 
second group, people would be paid conditionally to the correctness of their answers. 
The results obtained by Grether are not so clear-cut as the ones from the 
lawyers 1 engineers experiment. First, in most experiments, prior information is taken 
into account by the subjects, although its importance is generally underweighted; but even 
if they are not pure Bayesians, agents do use base rates information in estimating 
probabilities. However, there is a systematic bias in the formation of beliefs which is 
generated by something akin to the representativeness heuristic. For instance, whenever 
the final outcome (a draw of six balls) was exactly representative of urn A (four "Ns" and 
two "Gs") or urn B (three "Ns" and three "Gs'), the priors were almost ignored and the 
probability that the sample was drawn from urn A (respectively urn B) was very high, 
whatever the priorsg. Second, a rather puzzling result of Grether's experiment, at least 
for economists, is that monetary incentives do not seem to be of much importance: the 
general patterns were the same in the two groups, whether there was an incentive to make 
the correct choice or not. 
(ii) Overconfidence 
Another frequent behaviour which is at odds with Bayes' rule is overconfidence, i.e. 
the tendency to be "more confident in [our] judgements than is warranted by the facts" 
(Griffin & Tversky, 1992, p. 41 1). This bias is often provoked by an underestimation 
of the weight of the evidence (its quality or precision) and, simultaneously, an 
overestimation of its strength (its semantic content). 
An example of the combination of weight and strength of the evidence in a simple and 
well-defined setting is given by the heads and tails game, where weight is sample size 
and strength is sample proportion. Even in such a simple setting, Griffin & Tversky, 
1992, showed that people tended to be overconfident when strength was high and weight 
was low. People were presented with series of heads and tails resulting from spinning a 
coin. As the subjects were told, "unlike tossing, which (on average) yields an equal 
number of heads and tails, spinning a coin leads to a bias favouring one side or the other 
because of slight imperfections on the rim of the coin" (p. 414). People were given the 
value of the bias, the coin fell on one side three times out of five, but they did not know if 
the favoured side was heads or tails. They were then presented with twelve different 
samples of heads and tails, with varying sizes (from three to thirty three) and numbers of 
heads (from two to nineteen). All samples favoured heads. The subjects were asked to 
estimate the probability for each sample that the bias was in favour of heads. The results 
of this experiment highlights the way judgement by representativeness can induce 
overconfidence: each time the sample was small (from three to five) and the relative 
proportion of heads high, people's estimates were above their Bayesian values. Thus, 
overconfidence can be associated with an insufficient attention given to sample size 
(weight of the evidence) and too much attention given to sample proportion (strength of 
the evidence). But the symmetric is also true: when the sample was larger and the 
proportion of heads relatively smaller, people exhibited underconfidence, i.e. their 
estimates always lied under the Bayesian values. 
The same pattern was obtained in others experiments (Griffin & Tversky, 1992; 
KST, 1982) and, as for the neglect of priors, seems relatively robust. Some of these 
other experiments were done in more complicated settings, real-life situations involving 
representations about social, institutional and cultural events. The same biases were 
found in social situations than in pure chance settings. These findings, according to 
Griffin & Tversky, 1992, thus apply also when people have to form ')judgements about 
uncertain events such as who will win an upcoming election, or whether a given book 
will make the best-seller list. When people assess the probability of such events they 
evaluate [...I their impression of the candidate or the book" (pp. 422-23). However, as 
we shall see now, the interpretation of results obtained in "real world" situations is quite 
more complicated. 
(iii) "Real world" settings 
The comparison between the use of the representativeness heuristic in "real life" 
situations and in pure chance settings highlights two facts. First, the more complicated 
the environment, the more people use this heuristic. Second, representativeness is more 
difficult to define precisely, and to spot, when the environment is complicated and 
uncertain. 
Let us go back to the results about the neglect of prior information. The results of 
Kahneman & Tversky in the "lawyer1 engineer" study are more radical towards a 
rejection of the Bayesian hypothesis than the ones obtained by Grether, 1980, and 
Carnerer, 1987, in pure chance settings. But these results are less contradictory to what it 
seems from a first look. Indeed, when the problems are set up in terms of urns, as in 
Grether and in Camerer, it is easier to build a "good" representation of the problem 
because all the data is given and well-defined, and the necessary knowledge to solve the 
problem is contained in the data. The evidence at hand does not really ask for 
interpretation: the randomness is only deriving from the fact that the draws can be made 
from two different urns. In the engineer experiment, the knowledge mobilized and 
processed to solve the problem is much more complex, and has to do with the model one 
can have about how an engineer looks like, which in turn comes from our particular past 
experience -encounters with specific engineers- and the collective images entailed by 
social structures and "culture" at large. 
It should be noted that in the engineer case, people know that there are two types of 
agents, engineers and lawyers, and the only uncertainty stemms from the ambiguity 
concerning the "boundaries" of these two categories. Hence, one could argue that there 
is no true uncertainty, and that, if the environment is more complex than in urns 
problems, it is not radically uncertain. This may be true, depending on the acceptation of 
the notion of uncertainty. I do not wish to enter into these debates here; for the purpose 
of this paper, it suffices to consider that there is true uncertainty when it becomes 
impossible to define standard probabilities over the set of possible states of the world, 
which is the case in the engineer problemlo. To summarize, it may be possible to be 
almost Bayesian in well-defined, "close-worlds" problems, but the more the environment 
becomes uncertain, the richer the necessary knowledge, and the higher the probability to 
use simplifying heuristics instead of sophisticated mathematical constructions to form our 
beliefs. 
Representativeness in a complicated and evolving environment is much more difficult 
to define precisely than in pure games of chance, where the similarity criterion is unique, 
well-defined and it is thus possible to talk about "exact representativeness" (e.g. 
Camerer). In the real world, "the factors that make particular task and problem 
characteristics the salient ones with respect to which representativeness is judged" (Olson 
quoted by Bar-Hillel in KST, 1982, ch. 5, p. 73) cannot be defined a priori. In 
experiments where there were two possible criteria of similarity, people would order 
them differently, albeit the problem was well-defined, and arrive at different conclusions 
although they were following the same heuristic. Some studies have been done to make 
people "reveal" their representativeness criteria (e.g. Bar-Hillel in KST, 1982, ch. 5) by 
estimating similarities instead of probabilities. But this type of approach is, it seems, 
bound to fail because of the infinity of possible criteria. Typical categories (stereotypes) 
are context dependent and history dependent, and, if there are agreements about some 
basic features of some basic categories -communication would otherwise be impossible- 
the extent to which such agreements exist is very difficult to evaluate. I will come back to 
these issues in section IV. Another way to approach the problem could be to try to 
identify, in a given domain, some representations that seem to be commonly shared, i.e. 
some stereotypes, and to analyse the formation of beliefs of individuals that are not 
randomly chosen, but share similar concerns (as it has been done for instance by 
Kahneman & Lovallo on small businesses). The next section is devoted to such a 
(preliminary) tentative about representativeness on financial markets. 
111. Representativeness and financial instability 
There are basically two views of the functioning of financial and speculative markets. 
In the classical approach, agents are supposed to be fully rational; they trade financial 
assets only when their prices are going away from their equilibrium values, and by doing 
so, prices are pushed back to their fundamental levels. In this view, well exemplified by 





















